Based on the reality of safety production in manufacturing enterprises and the background of industrial Internet, a tripartite evolutionary game model of industrial internet safety production supervision platform - manufacturing enterprises - government was constructed to analyze and verify the stability of the system's evolutionary strategy. The effects of the commission coefficient paid by the manufacturing enterprises, the development and operating cost coefficient of the platform, and the amount of fines imposed by the government on the platform on the evolution results are studied. The results show that increasing the commission coefficient paid by manufacturing enterprises can improve the probability of the platform choosing a high degree of safety production supervision service level and the probability of manufacturing enterprises choosing to join the industrial internet safety production supervision platform.Reducing the development and operating cost coefficient of the platform can improve the probability of the platform choosing a high degree of production safety supervision service level. Increasing the amount of fines imposed by the government on the platform can improve the probability of the platform choosing a high degree of production safety supervision service level, and the probability of the government choosing to actively regulate the industrial Internet production safety supervision platform.