基于演化博弈研究的机场净空安全监管
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Airport Clearance Safety Supervision Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
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    摘要:

    为提升机场净空安全监管水平,保障机场净空区域的安全运行,构建了机场管理部门与净空违规者之间的演化博弈模型,深入分析了双方在不同情景条件下的策略选择及其成因。运用MATLAB软件对重要参数的敏感度进行了数值分析,探讨了净空违规者违规运行被发现的概率、处罚力度、合规运行成本以及违规运行收入四个重要参数对系统演化路径及演化结果的影响。结果表明,提高违规操作被发现的概率和加大处罚力度,可以有效促使违规者向合规运行策略转变;同时,通过降低合规运行成本和限制违规收益,能够进一步减少违规行为的发生概率。

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    To enhance the level of safety management in airport clearance zones and ensure safe operations within these areas, an evolutionary game model between airport management authorities and clearance violators was constructed. An in-depth analysis of the strategic choices was provided made by both parties under different scenario conditions and the underlying reasons for these choices was exploreed. Using MATLAB software, a sensitivity analysis of key parameters was conducted, examining the impact of four crucial factors, such as the probability of detecting violations, penalty severity, compliance operation costs, and non-compliance income, on the system’s evolutionary path and outcomes. The results show that increasing the probability of detecting violations and imposing stricter penalties can effectively encourage violators to shift towards compliant strategies. Furthermore, reducing compliance costs and limiting non-compliance income can further decrease the probability of violations occurring.

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文军,樊志翔.基于演化博弈研究的机场净空安全监管[J].科技与产业,2025,25(06):36-41

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  • 在线发布日期: 2025-04-07
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