基于演化博弈理论的装配式建筑激励策略
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Incentive Strategy of Prefabricated Buildings Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
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    摘要:

    为了解决装配式建筑发展缓慢的问题,从建筑产业链的角度考虑,运用演化博弈理论对目前装配式建筑产业链中三大主体(政府、开发商、制造商)的行为进行分析,构建“政府-开发商”“开发商-制造商”两两激励的演化博弈模型,得到各主体的最优策略。通过分析,博弈的稳定均衡与系统的初始状态密切相关,只有当政府进行积极的经济激励,直接给予开发商财政补贴,开发商积极配合政府政策开发装配式建筑并对下游制造商进行成本分担时,才能实现三方利益共赢,推动装配式建筑的发展。

    Abstract:

    In order to solve the problem of the slow development of prefabricated buildings, from the perspective of building industry chain, the behaviors of the three main bodies (the government, developers and manufacturer) in the current prefabricated building industry chain are analyzed. An evolutionary game model of "government-developers" and "developers-manufacturers" pairwise incentives are constructed, so as to obtain the optimal strategy of each main body. Through analysis, the stability and equilibrium of the game is closely related to the initial state of the system. Only when the government gives positive economic incentives, directly grants financial subsidies to developers, and developers actively cooperate with government policies to develop prefabricated buildings and share the costs of downstream manufacturers can the three parties achieve a win-win situation and promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

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王凡俊,陈德凡,赵宝库.基于演化博弈理论的装配式建筑激励策略[J].科技与产业,2023,23(09):81-89

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  • 在线发布日期: 2023-05-29
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