基于博弈论的共享短租合谋监管制度优化
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Optimization of Supervision System of Short-term Shared Rent Collusion Based on Game Theory
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    摘要:

    在国家大力发展文化旅游的浪潮下,共享短租行业应运而生。共享短租平台在给租客带来便利的同时,作为兴新行业为占领市场,选择和房东合谋的错误手段,严重违反市场纪律,损害用户的利益。通过建立博弈模型分析共享短租合谋的原因,并运用制度工程学的相关原理和方法,在观测力度和惩罚力度方面对共享短租合谋监管制度进行优化,为共享短租行业健康发展给出对策。

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    In the country development tide of cultural tourism, the sharing of short-term rent industry came into being. Short-term rent sharing platforms not only bring convenience to tenants, but also choose the wrong means of colluding with landlords in order to occupy the market as a new industry, which seriously violates market discipline and damages the interests of users. By establishing a game model, the causes of collusion of short-term rent sharing was analyzed, and relevant principles and methods of institutional engineering was used to optimize the supervision system of collusion of short-term rent sharing in terms of observation intensity and punishment intensity, so as to provide countermeasures for the healthy development of short-term rent sharing industry.

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钱若芸,张峥.基于博弈论的共享短租合谋监管制度优化[J].科技与产业,2022,22(01):134-140

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  • 在线发布日期: 2022-01-27
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