The characteristics of state-owned enterprises can easily lead to imperfect corporate governance structure、 absence of owners and principal-agent problems,The imperfect governance structure prevents the board of directors, the board of supervisors, the management and the staff from performing their respective duties,In the principal-agent problem, the long agency chain aggravates the degree of information asymmetry between the principal and the agent, which leads to the state-owned enterprise executives to abuse their power to seek profits for themselves,At the same time, the absence of owners in state-owned enterprises makes the virtual "owners" lack motivation to supervise the executives, and the imperfect internal supervision mechanism is also one of the reasons for the imbalance of power among executives in state-owned enterprises.In conjunction with the 19th national congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which proposed to "uphold the party's leadership in all work",We will strengthen the participation of party organizations and workers' congresses in the governance of state-owned enterprises,clarify the subject of property rights and make the subject of investment diversify to fill the vacancy of the owner, establish a dynamic power allocation mechanism and implement corresponding incentive measures to shorten the principal-agent chain, and establish an effective internal supervision mechanism, so as to reasonably and effectively balance the power of senior executives.