乳制品加工企业质量控制策略进化博弈分析
DOI:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

基金项目:


Evolutionary Game Analysis of Quality Control Strategy in Dairy Processing Enterprises
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
    摘要:

    结合市场上存在的“搭便车”现象,分别构建单种群和双种群进化博弈模型,分析了乳制品加工企业之间、乳制品加工企业与政府监管部门之间的质量控制策略空间及其演化趋势。结果表明:乳制品加工企业之间的单种群博弈和乳制品加工企业与政府监管部门之间的双种群博弈均存在三个进化稳定策略,“搭便车”收益、质量控制成本和政府惩罚力度等因素影响着群体策略空间及演化趋势。提高消费者质量意识和维权意识、加大政府惩罚力度、降低质量控制成本、扩大优质与劣质乳制品的价差能够有效防止“搭便车”行为,促进我国乳制品行业的健康发展。

    Abstract:

    Considering the phenomenon of "free ride" in the market, the single - species and double - species evolutionary game model were constructed respectively to analyze the quality control strategy space between dairy processing enterprises, dairy processing enterprises and government regulators and its evolution trend. The results show that there are three evolutionary stabilization strategies in the single population game between dairy processing enterprises and in the double population game between dairy processing enterprises and government regulators, which are affected by the "free ride" income, the cost of enterprise quality control and government punishment. Improving the awareness of quality and rights of consumer, increasing the government's punishment, reducing the quality control costs of dairy products, expanding the price difference of dairy products between the finer and the inferior can effectively prevent the "free rider" behavior, and promote the healthy development of China's dairy industry.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

郭延景,吴强,孙世民.乳制品加工企业质量控制策略进化博弈分析[J].科技与产业,2017,(10):65-71

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2017-11-23
×
《科技和产业》
喜报 | 学会期刊《科技和产业》成为国家哲学社会科学文献中心2024年度最受欢迎的经济学期刊