军民深度融合下民营企业与军工企业博弈分析
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The Game Analysis of Private Enterprise and Military Enterprise under the Deep Integration of Army-civilian
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    摘要:

    构建民营企业与军工企业的博弈概念模型,基于军民融合当前发展特色提出博弈假设条件;依据军民融合程度,分别建立其完全信息静态博弈收益矩阵、完全信息动态博弈博弈树以及军民深度融合下完全信息动态博弈模型,从而分析当前影响民营企业与军工企业博弈的重要因素;最后总结军民深度融合背景下民营企业和军工企业的最佳决策选择,并依据博弈分析结果提出中国民营企业与军工企业在武器装备科研生产领域竞争合作的启示和建议。

    Abstract:

    The paper built the private enterprises and military enterprises’ concept game model, and proposed the private enterprises and military enterprises’ game assumptions based on the current characteristic of army-civilian’s integration; secondly, depending on the degree of army-civilian’s integration, established the private enterprises and military enterprises’ complete information static game payoff matrix, dynamic game tree, complete information static game under the deep integration of army-civilian, and obtained the important factors effecting the cooperation of private enterprises and military enterprises by backward induction analysis; finally, concluded the private enterprises’ and military enterprises’ best decision options under the deep integration of army-civilian, then proposed the private enterprises’ and military enterprises’ related inspiration and advice in the field of weaponry research and production when facing competition and cooperation.

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姜李丹,蔡静静,何海燕.军民深度融合下民营企业与军工企业博弈分析[J].科技与产业,2016,(03):87-91

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  • 在线发布日期: 2016-03-20
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