养羊场户标准化生产经营行为的进化博弈分析
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Analysis of Evolutionary Game of Standardized Production and Management Behavior of Sheep-raising Households or Farms
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    摘要:

    标准化生产经营是转变养羊业生产经营方式,提高养羊业综合实力,实现羊产业健康发展的重要途径。本文运用进化博弈的双种群博弈理论,研究了养羊场户和政府之间关于标准化生产经营行为的决策过程及其影响因素。研究表明,采用标准化生产经营行为的超额收益、补贴收益、奖励资金,以及不采用标准化生产经营行为的环境损失、潜在损失和采用前的风险发生率等对养羊场户采用标准化生产经营行为决策的演进方向有正影响;采用标准化生产经营行为的投入成本和采用后的风险发生率对养羊场户采用标准化生产经营行为决策的演进方向有负影响。

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    Standardized production and management is an important way to transfer the way of production and management of sheep husbandry, to improve the comprehensive strength of sheep husbandry and to achieve the healthy development of the sheep farming industry. This paper uses the theory of evolutionary game and researches the decision process and its factors between sheep-raising households or farms and government about the standardized production and management behavior. The result shows that the abnormal return, subsidy, incentive funds using the standardized production and management behavior and the environmental loss, potential loss, the incidence of risk not using standardized production and management behavior have a positive impact on the evolution direction of using the standardized production and management behavior of the sheep-raising households or farms. And the input costs and the incidence of risk using the standardized production and management behavior have a negative impact on the evolution direction of using the standardized production and management behavior of the sheep-raising households or farms.

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祝士平,孙世民,韩丽敏.养羊场户标准化生产经营行为的进化博弈分析[J].科技与产业,2015,(08):5-8

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  • 在线发布日期: 2015-09-11
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