SMP与PAB电力竞价机制的激励性研究
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Study on the Incentive Compatibility of the SMP and PAB Bidding Mode in Electricity Market
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    摘要:

    电力市场的两种基本竞价机制为传统的统一边际价竞价机制(SMP机制)和按报价支付的竞价机制(PAB机制)。首先从拍卖角度出发讨论两种竞价机制激励性,并对两种机制下发电商行使市场力的机理进行了深入分析。分析得出,无论是统一边际价竞价机制还是按报价支付的竞价机制都缺乏让发电商按真实成本信息报价的激励相容性,存在发电商虚报高价的现象,影响电力系统的稳定运行和经济调度。因而需要设计一种新的具有激励相容特性的价格机制。

    Abstract:

    The two basic mechanisms of electricity market are the traditional system marginal price bidding mechanism and pay-as-bid auction mechanism. This paper discussed the incentive compatibility of SMP and PAB auction mechanism from the auction point of view, and then make an in-depth analysis of the reason why power generators abuse market power under the two basic mechanisms. Through the analysis we can get the conclusion that both the SMP and PAB auction mechanism are lack of the incentive compatibility which make power generators bid according to the true cost information, so it affects the stability of the electrical power system and the economic power dispatch.Thus,a new bidding mechanism with the incentive compatibility is needed.

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冀巨海,王昌,李晋,李喜军. SMP与PAB电力竞价机制的激励性研究[J].科技与产业,2012,(1):73-77

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