生态扶贫PPP项目政府与社会资本方演化博弈研究
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Research on Evolutionary Game between Government and Social Capital in PPP Project of Ecological Poverty Alleviation
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    摘要:

    为了更好地促进生态扶贫PPP项目的建设,通过构建演化博弈模型,分析了政府和社会资本方进行策略选择的动态演化路径,研究发现:在生态扶贫PPP项目中,对演化博弈稳定状态起决定意义的因素就是社会资本方获得保底收益和溢出效益的大小,另外政府方在获得的溢出的生态效益和扶贫效益与补贴成本之间的权衡也会影响博弈稳定状态。因此,得出结论认为要开发那些能使社会资本方获得稳定收益的项目,比如生态产业项目,以满足社会资本方的逐利性同时也能兼顾生态扶贫效果。

    Abstract:

    In order to better promote the construction of PPP project of ecological poverty alleviation, this paper analyzes the dynamic evolution path of government and social capital party's strategy selection by constructing evolutionary game model. The research finds that the factors which decide the evolutionary game’ stable state in the ecological poverty alleviation PPP project, is the size of the social capital side to obtain the bottom-earning income and the spillover benefits. In addition, the trade-off between the government's acquired ecological benefits and the benefits of poverty alleviation and subsidy costs will also affect the stable state of the game. Therefore, the article believes that it is necessary to develop projects that enable social capital to obtain stable returns, such as eco-industrial projects, to meet the profit-seeking nature of social capital while also taking into account the effects of ecological poverty alleviation.

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李雅洁.生态扶贫PPP项目政府与社会资本方演化博弈研究[J].科技与产业,2019,(06):69-78

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  • 在线发布日期: 2019-06-25